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IS THE WISCONSIN STATE
CONSTITUTION OBSOLETE?
TOWARD A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
FUNCTIONALIST ASSESSMENT*
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS**
More than two-thirds of the states now operate under
constitutions that are more than a century old, that were
designed to meet the problems of another era, and that
are riddled with piecemeal amendments that have
compromised their coherence as plans of government. In
addition, the public disdain for government at all levels,
together with the increasing reliance on direct democracy
for policy making in the states, suggests a need for
constitutional reforms designed to increase the
responsiveness of state institutions and to promote
popular involvement that does not preclude serious
deliberation about policy options. Many state
constitutions would benefit from substantial changes
designed to make state governments more effective,
equitable, and responsive, and to equip them to deal with
the challenges of the twenty-first century.
G. Alan Tarr'
I. INTRODUCTION
Does Dr. Alan Tarr's assessment apply to Wisconsin? Is the state
constitution obsolete? This is a fundamentally different question from
whether it contains specific defects. That is the focus of this conference.
* This is an expanded version of a lecture given at a conference, Is the Wisconsin
Constitution Obsolete? at Marquette University School of Law, October 6, 2006. I want to
thank David Batista and Lori Rowland of the law library at Rutgers Law School, Camden, for
assistance in researching and obtaining Wisconsin materials.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden;
Associate Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies, http://www.camlaw.rutgers.edu
/statecon.
1. G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1, 3-4 (G. Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).
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The Wisconsin Constitution is, without doubt, well over a century-
and-a-half old. Operating under its original statehood constitution of
1848,2 which followed quickly upon the heels of the failed constitution
of 1846,3 Wisconsin is one of the few states to retain its original, albeit
often amended, constitution.
At the close of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitutional Convention, its
President, Morgan L. Martin of Brown County, told the delegates:
The result of our labors, if approved, becomes
henceforth the supreme law of our adopted land, and
whether well or ill done it stands forth as the record of
our united opinions upon the form of government best
suited to the condition of our people. Following the
example set by the Great Architect of the universe, we
may without irreverence look upon the pages of our
constitution and pronounce the work of our hands to be
good. It abounds in the declaration of those great
principles which characterize the age in which we live,
and which, under the protection of Heaven, will-nay,
must-guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and
secure the permanent welfare of our beloved country.'
It is highly doubtful that Martin or any of his colleagues could have
imagined that we would be here in the twenty-first century evaluating
their often-amended, but still basically intact handiwork.
II. THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
Wisconsin, as noted above, is still operating under its original state
constitution, which is relatively short.6 The Wisconsin Constitution has
2. Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 648, 648.
3. Gordon B. Baldwin, Introduction: Celebrating Wisconsin's Constitution 150 Years
Later, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 661, 668-71; Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin
Constitution, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 23, 23. For an exhaustive documentation of the
consideration, and defeat, of the 1846 Constitution see WISCONSIN HISTORICAL Soc'Y, THE
STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 1846-1847 (Milo M. Quaife ed. 1920).
4. ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 431 (2d ed.
2006); see also R. Lawrence Hachey, Jacksonian Democracy and the Wisconsin Constitution,
62 MARQ. L. REV. 485 (1979).
5. WiS. HISTORICAL Soc'Y, THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD 883 (Milo M. Quaife
ed. 1928).
6. Donald S. Lutz, Patterns in the Amending of American State Constitutions, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND
HISTORICAL PATTERNS 24, 32-34 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
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been amended an average of less than once per year.7 This amendment
rate is actually substantially below the mean rate of amendment for
state constitutions.8
It is possible, under one view, to see Wisconsin's 1848 constitution as
obsolete as soon as it was adopted. The well-known Wisconsin legal
scholar, James Willard Hurst, noted that, at least with respect to specific
policies reflected in state constitutions, they "did not direct, but merely
recorded, the currents of social change. Most of this constitutional
wisdom was the wisdom of hindsight."9  One piece of evidence to
illustrate this view was that the major reasons for the defeat of the 1846
constitution were the progressive provisions on married women's
property, on the homestead exemption, and on limiting banks; there was
not a social consensus on those matters.' ° In addition, they are not
issues of state constitutional magnitude today. The Wisconsin
Constitution was adopted during the 1844-1853 decade when over half
of the existing states held constitutional conventions." To the extent
that some of the provisions of Wisconsin's original constitution were
"borrowed" from other state constitutions, there is at least further
evidence that much of that constitution was already accepted practice."
As Frank Grad and I have recently contended, there is no "ideal"
state constitution. 3 We characterized state constitutions as tools or
instruments of government, the "suitability and adaptability" of which
POLITICS IN THE STATES]; see also Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 367 (1994) [hereinafter Lutz, Toward a Theory].
7. Lutz, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES, supra note 6, at 34. The rates
have varied over the decades. JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 8 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No.
28, G. Alan Tarr series ed., 1997).
8. Lutz, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES, supra note 6, at 34.
9. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
246 (1950).
10. MADDEX, supra note 4, at 430-431; STARK, supra note 7, at 4-6; Brown, supra note
2, at 669-73, 676-84. The homestead exemption provision is thoroughly analyzed in Bernard
R. Trujillo, The Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846: An Historical Perspective on the
Regulation of Debt, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 747.
11. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 94 (1998).
12. G. Alan Tarr, Models and Fashions in State Constitutionalism, 1998 WiS. L. REV. 729,
729. As Willard Hurst noted: "There was a sort of stare decisis about this making of
constitutions; it was altogether natural in a country in which men moved about readily, taking
with them the learning and institutions of their former homes." HURST, supra note 9, at 224-
25.
13. FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND
AMENDMENTS 7,13 (2006).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"can only be gauged in the relationship to its set task." 14 Therefore, the
question of whether the current Wisconsin Constitution is obsolete
should be analyzed through an evaluation of how it actually functions
within the state. This needs to be a hard-nosed assessment in "the
trenches," not a library exercise. We concluded:
The least we may demand of our state constitutions is
that they interpose no obstacle to the necessary exercise
of state powers in response to state residents' real needs
and active demands for service....
Any review of the adequacy of a state's constitution
must begin, therefore, not by comparing the state's
present constitution with the more recently adopted
charter of another state or with the provisions of some
"model" draft, but rather by systematically examining
the entire machinery and operation of the state's
government.15
How would one measure the functional effectiveness, or lack
thereof, of the Wisconsin Constitution? The tax uniformity provision,
article VIII, section 1, has been interpreted to ban a partial property tax
freeze for redeveloped property in urban areas.16 The provisions on
taxation and education, article VIII, section 1 and article X, section 3,
were held to prohibit the shifting of local tax revenue from property-rich
14. Id. at 8; see also Donald S. Lutz, The Purposes of American State Constitutions, 12
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 27, 31 (1982) ("A written constitution is a political technology. In a
sense it is the very embodiment of the technology for achieving the good life.") (footnote
omitted).
15. GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 12; see also TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER
THE STATES 189 (1967) (suggesting revision of state constitutions which had been "for so long
the drag anchors of state progress"). Comparisons may, however, be interesting and useful.
See, e.g., Jack Stark, A Comparison of the Wisconsin and Iowa Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 1019, 1019 (2000) (concluding that because Wisconsin has some provisions not found in
Iowa, and "Iowa's courts have been more hesitant to declare statutes unconstitutional....
Iowa's constitution has had less effect on Iowa's legal system and, thus, less effect on that
state than Wisconsin's constitution has had on Wisconsin").
16. Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 431,147 N.W.2d 633, 645 (1967); Jack
Stark, The Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 577, 596
(1993). Such a holding was congruent with Morton Horwitz's argument that the state
constitutional uniformity provisions, particularly as analyzed in Judge Thomas Cooley's 1876
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION, served as a strong impediment to the use of state and
local taxation as mechanisms for the redistribution of wealth. See MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 20-24 (1992).
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districts to poor districts. 17 On the other hand, the state constitutional
debt limit provision has been interpreted not to limit major public
investment in a new stadium.' 8 Nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution
has stood in the way of use of public money to support students in
private, even religious, schools.' 9 A major "tort-reform" statute has
been struck down under the Wisconsin Constitution." Wisconsin's
constitutional free speech provision has been interpreted so as not to
require free expression on private property such as shopping malls.2 I
express no opinion whether these decisions should lead to state
constitutional change. It is obvious, though, that any assessment of a
current state constitution such as Wisconsin's must take account of the
authoritative judicial interpretations,22 as well as informal adjustments
to the state constitution.23
In considering the stability of the Wisconsin Constitution, it is clear
that it has been changed through amendment and judicial interpretation,
but has never been either replaced or reformed.2" These are very
important distinctions in the area of state constitutional development.
Alan Tarr explained the distinction:
17. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 580-81, 247 N.W.2d 141, 155 (1976); Comment, State
Constitutional Restrictions on School Finance Reform: Buse v. Smith, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1528,
1530 (1977); Erik LeRoy, Comment, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the
Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 1325, 1327-28.
18. Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 826, 546 N.W.2d 424, 440 (1996);
Jack Stark, A History of the Internal Improvements Section of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1998
Wis. L. REV. 829,838-39.
19. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 906, 578 N.W.2d 602, 632 (1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 997 (1998).
20. Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 3, 295 Wis. 2d 38, 3, 717
N.W.2d 216, 1 3; see Michael S. Kenitz, Comment, Wisconsin's Caps on Noneconomic
Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases: Where Wisconsin Stands (and Should Stand) on "Tort
Reform," 89 MARQ. L. REV. 601,602-07 (2006).
21. Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 530, 407 N.W.2d 832, 848 (1987); Brady C.
Williamson & James A. Friedman, State Constitutions: The Shopping Mall Cases, 1998 WIS. L.
REV. 883, 895-903.
22. Jack Stark noted that because Wisconsin has never replaced its original constitution
"its history after ratification consists of legal opinions that interpreted it and of amendments."
STARK, supra note 7, at 8.
23. Michael Besso, Constitutional Amendment Procedures and the Informal Political
Construction of Constitutions, 67 J. POL. 69, 69 (2005).
24. For an excellent, broad-brush summary of the Wisconsin constitution's evolution see
STARK, supra note 7, at 8-32, and Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin's Constitutional Amendment
Habit: A Disease or a Cure?, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 667 (2007).
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Of course, it is possible to introduce significant
constitutional reform without calling a convention or
adopting a new constitution-amendments proposed by
constitutional commissions, by initiative, or by state
legislatures may also produce constitutional reform. But
in thinking about constitutional reform, it is important to
distinguish it from the ordinary constitutional change
that is so prevalent in the states. Any alteration of a
state constitution, no matter how technical or minor,
qualifies as constitutional change. In contrast,
constitutional reform involves a more fundamental
reconsideration of constitutional foundations. It
introduces changes of considerable breadth and impact,
changes that substantially affect the operation of state
government or the public policy of the state. The
replacement of one constitution by another obviously
qualifies as constitutional reform. So too may major
constitutional amendments or interconnected sets of
amendments. However, most constitutional change in
the states does not qualify.25
These are, of course, not perfect, bright-line distinctions, but they are
important distinctions all the same.26 Therefore, the fundamental
questions in evaluating the functionality of the Wisconsin Constitution
are whether "piecemeal amendments . . . have compromised [its]
coherence as [a] plan[] of government, ' to such an extent that there is
a necessity of "fundamental reconsideration of constitutional
25. G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1, 2 (G. Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams eds., 2006); see also Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California:
The Triumph of Amendment over Revision, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra, at 64:
In theory, constitutional revision should be more comprehensive and
qualitatively more significant than a constitutional amendment. But what
if revision occurs increasingly through amendment: What is gained and
what is lost? The most important advantage should lie in the ability of a
Revision Commission to consider how all the pieces fit together. Where
the amendment process is piecemeal and sequential, the revision process
affords the opportunity to logically relate proposals to goals, and to make
the entire package of proposal[s] coherent.
Id. at 65 (internal citations omitted).
26. Tarr, supra note 25, at 3.
27. Tarr, supra note 1, at 3.
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foundations., 21 Under this view, even if a number of specific problems
or defects were identified in Wisconsin's constitution (and people would
differ on each of these), those might continue to be addressed by
amendment, short of state constitutional reform or revision.
In evaluating the Wisconsin Constitution in an attempt to determine
whether it is obsolete and in need of reform or revision, it should
definitely not be compared to the United States Constitution.29 There
are a variety of reasons for this lack of fit. State constitutions, even
Wisconsin's relatively short one, are substantially longer than the
Federal Constitution.0 But the two kinds of constitutions are also called
upon to perform different functions and are therefore, not comparable
on the basis of length. The Federal Constitution is incomplete as a
governing document; it depends on the state governments to function
within it, and serves to delegate a limited set of powers to the national
government. State constitutions structure a sub-national government-
a government functioning within a government-and serve primarily to
limit the plenary authority retained by states at the time of formation of
the Union. Therefore, the federal and state constitutions perform
different legal and political functions, and there is simply a wider variety
of subject matter to be regulated by a state constitution than there is
under the United States Constitution.3'
Further, even by the time of Wisconsin's adoption of its original
constitution, state constitutions had already begun to evolve from basic
charters of government and protections of rights to encompass, in
addition, policy matters that could have been left to the state legislature.
Dr. Tarr has noted that "[s]tate constitutions, in contrast [to the U. S.
Constitution], deal directly with matters of public policy, sometimes in
considerable detail."32  These sorts of policy provisions may prohibit
legislative action, mandate the enactment of certain policies, or directly
enact the policies themselves.33 Dr. Tarr concluded that during the
nineteenth century "state constitutions increasingly became instruments
of government rather than merely frameworks for government."34 The
28. Tarr, supra note 25, at 2.
29. See GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 14.
30. Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is it Necessary?, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 1327, 1329 (2001).
31. Id. at 1329. See generally Donald S. Lutz, The United States Constitution as an
Incomplete Text, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 23 (1988).
32. TARR, supra note 11, at 20; see also infra note 164 and accompanying text.
33. TARR, supra note 11, at 21.
34. Id. at 132; see also Hammons, supra note 30, at 1332-33.
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Wisconsin State Constitution's coverage of, for example, tax and
finance,35 education,36 and corporations,37 while not so different from
other state constitutions, clearly illustrates this point. Do policy-
oriented provisions in state constitutions become obsolete or incoherent
more quickly than framework-oriented provisions?
The Wisconsin Constitution is not only older, shorter, and less often
amended than most state constitutions, but it is also, relatively, more
difficult to amend. The question of whether to call a constitutional
convention may only be presented to the voters by the legislature.
Because Wisconsin does not permit use of the initiative to propose
amendments to the state constitution, nor does it have any required
automatic mechanism of review built into it," it is located toward the
more difficult end of the spectrum of amendment procedures. 9 Even
Wisconsin's procedure for legislatively-proposed state constitutional
amendments is quite rigorous, requiring passage by a majority vote of
elected legislators, passage through two successive sessions, and separate
presentation of issues to the voters.' At the time Wisconsin adopted
these rigorous procedures for amendment, the issue was one of
importance in state constitutional conventions across the country.4'
35. WIS. CONST. art. VIII.
36. Id. art. X.
37. Id. art. XI.
38. G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from Here to There: Twenty-
First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
1075, 1079 (2005) ("Fourteen state constitutions mandate that the question of whether to hold
a convention be submitted to voters periodically."). Interestingly, the failed 1846 Wisconsin
constitution included a provision, borrowed from New York, requiring that an automatic
convention question be placed on the ballot every ten years. Brown, supra note 2, at 691.
The 1848 Constitution did not include this provision. Brown, supra note 3, at 61.
39. Tarr & Williams, supra note 38, at 1075 n.1.
40. WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1. On this latter question of separate presentation of
amendments to the electors, see the very interesting, in-depth consideration of this matter by
the California Supreme Court in Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson, 134 P.3d
299 (Cal. 2006). See also GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 70, 72; Gerald Benjamin &
Melissa Cusa, Constitutional Amendment Through the Legislature in New York, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES, supra note 6, at 47.
41. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 29-47
(2006); see Brown, supra note 2, at 691. In 1960, a constitutional commission in Wisconsin
recommended easing these processes for legislatively-proposed amendments. The first
proposal would have permitted an amendment to be submitted to the voters after passage
through only one legislative session if it received a two-thirds vote in each house on its first
consideration. This proposal was defeated in the legislature in 1961. The second proposal
would have given the legislature broader latitude in submitting "in a single question a revision
of a portion of the constitution or of items reasonably related to each other." This proposal
passed the 1961 and 1963 legislatures but was defeated at the polls in April 1964. See Justice
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Wisconsin has rejected, though probably not consciously, the
Jeffersonian view that state constitutions should be revised once every
generation42 in favor of the Madisonian preference for a more stable
state constitution. 4 This conflict between stability and ease of change
has persisted through the entire evolution of state constitutions.
Stephen Holmes has captured the modern conflict:
Some theorists worry that democracy will be paralyzed
by constitutional straitjacketing. Others are
apprehensive that the constitutional dyke will be
breached by a democratic flood. Despite their
differences, both sides agree that there exists a deep,
almost irreconcilable tension between constitutionalism
and democracy. Indeed, they come close to suggesting
that "constitutional democracy" is a marriage of
opposites, an oxymoron.'
If state constitutional revision is too difficult, constitutionalism
overwhelms democracy; if it is too easy, democracy overwhelms
constitutionalism. It is difficult to achieve exactly the right balance, and
this point might change over time. Any assessment of the Wisconsin
Constitution's obsolescence must also take account of, and consider
adjustments in, the processes of changing or revising the constitution.
Recently Jack Stark, a well-known scholar of the Wisconsin
Constitution, assessed the reason that the Wisconsin Constitution,
although amended fairly often, has remained basically stable:
Thomas E. Fairchild, Governor's Commission on Constitutional Revision, 37 WIS. BAR BULL.
June 1964, at 6, 7. For the recommendations, see COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 4-6,9, 15 (Dec. 1960).
42. Jefferson's letter on this subject is quoted in Albert L. Sturm, The Development of
American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 57, 66 n.24 (1982). See also JOHN
R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
59-78 (1992); John Dinan, "The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation": The
Development of State Constitutional Amendment and Revision Procedures, 62 REV. POL. 645,
647-51 (2000); Merrill D. Peterson, Mr. Jefferson's 'Sovereignty of the Living Generation,' 52
VA. Q. REV. 437 (1976).
43. LAURA J. SCALIA, AMERICA'S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: REMAKING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 1820-1850, at 4-5 (1999); see also Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the
Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195-97 (Jon Elster &
Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
44. Holmes, supra note 43, at 197.
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This generality has reduced the need to undergo the
cumbersome process of amending the constitution when
one of its provisions becomes dated or obviously bad
public policy. A fairly large number of amendments
have been ratified, but the constitution's basic shape has
changed little. This generality also makes the legislature
accountable to the electorate; whereas, a very specific
constitution would have allowed legislators to argue
credibly that the constitution had tied their hands. In
short, on this matter the delegates chose wisely. 5
What about the content of the Wisconsin Constitution? A recent
commentator, Dr. Christopher Hammons, has formulated the
distinction between "framework-oriented" and "policy-oriented"
provisions in state constitutions.46 Dr. Hammons analyzed all of the
state constitutions according to this distinction and concluded that only
thirty percent of Wisconsin's constitution is made up of policy-oriented
provisions.4 ' This is well below the national average of about forty
percent.48 Of course what constitutes a policy-oriented provision, rather
than a framework-oriented provision can be in the eyes of the beholder,
and neutral, academic observers may not appreciate the important
historic and political reasons why state constitutions contain certain
detailed provisions." Interestingly, Dr. Hammons concluded that the
45. STARK, supra note 7, at 8; see also GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 15.
46. Hammons, supra note 30, at 1338:
Framework provisions are those provisions that deal exclusively with the
principles, institutions, powers, and processes of government. They
provide the basic building blocks of government. Policy provisions are
defined as those provisions that deal with "statute law" or "public-policy"
type issues, do not relate to the establishment of the government, are
rather specific, typically do not apply to all citizens, and often provide
differential benefits. It is these provisions that most political scientists and
legal scholars consider "extra-constitutional."
See id. at 1351 (examples of each type of provision); see also Christopher W. Hammons, Was
James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short Framework-Oriented
Constitution, 93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 837, 846-847(1999) (more detailed list of examples).
47. Hammons, supra note 46, at 837, 848 (referring to policy-oriented provisions as
"particularistic").
48. Hammons, supra note 30, at 1333; see also Hammons, supra note 46, at 840 (thirty-
nine percent).
49. For each provision in a state constitution, no matter how seemingly trivial, there is a
story to be told. It may be a political story rather than an epic, "constitutional" story. As
Lawrence Friedman stated "[t]here was a point to every clause in these inflated constitutions.
Each one reflected the wishes of some faction or interest group, which tried to make its
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longer and more policy oriented a state constitution is, the longer it
endures before replacement." Wisconsin's constitution seems to defy
this conclusion.
III. PROPOSALS TO REVISE THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
The fact that the question is now being raised in Wisconsin as to
whether it's constitution is obsolete, and therefore in need of revision or
reform, puts the state in the company of several others that have
considered reform in response to realizations such as reflected in the
introductory quote from Dr. Tarr.5' Further, calls for revision or reform
of the Wisconsin Constitution are not new. For example, in 1950, the
state attorney general, Thomas Fairchild, called for a constitutional
convention to be convened and made a number of specific
recommendations. 2  Attorney General Fairchild in an article co-
authored with Charles P. Siebold observed:
The Constitution of Wisconsin is now over one hundred
years old, and general revision has not been attempted
since its adoption by the 1848 Constitutional Convention
and its subsequent ratification by the people of
Wisconsin. Because of the changes in the needs of our
society, it seems timely to consider the problems and
techniques of revision of the Constitution as a whole. 3
He was anticipating the distinction between state constitutional
change and reform, later espoused by Alan Tarr." The same words, of
course, are being uttered today and that is the purpose of this
conference. From this vantage point, it is difficult to determine how
seriously the attorney general's recommendations were taken, but it is
clear that no general revision of the state constitution took place in
response to his call. Among his recommendations were reforming the
policies permanent by freezing them into the charter. Constitutions, like treaties, preserved
the terms of compromise between warring groups." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 119 (2d ed. 1985).
50. Hammons, supra note 30, at 1338-1341; Hammons, supra note 46, at 845.
51. Hammons, supra note 30, at 1327 ("During the last decade the four most populous
states in the Union-California, New York, Florida, and Texas-each conducted a serious
review of its state constitution.").
52. Thomas E. Fairchild & Charles P. Siebold, Constitutional Revision in Wisconsin,
1950 Wis. L. REV. 201,201.
53. Id.
54. Tarr, supra note 25, at 2.
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judiciary, making executive branch officials appointed rather than
elected, adopting a unicameral legislature, reforming county
government, making the reapportionment process independent of the
legislature, and adopting initiative and referendum as avenues of direct
legislation." A useful exercise might be to analyze carefully Attorney
General Fairchild's 1950 proposals to see if they responded to an actual
functional incoherence in the Wisconsin Constitution, necessitating
constitutional revision, or were, rather, a series of constitutional changes
that could be accomplished individually. Some, but not all, of his
proposals have been accomplished without general revision of the state
constitution. Thus, the call for a "frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles" is neither new here in Wisconsin nor in other states.56
Although it is clear that Wisconsin's constitution has not been
revised and is amended at a rate less frequently than the national
average, this does not mean that state constitutional change, and even
revision, has not been regularly on the minds of Wisconsin political
actors and citizens. The Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau noted,
in a 1966 report:
From 1848-1965 a total of 1,389 proposals were
introduced, but only 120 proposed changes reached the
final stage of submission to the electorate. Including the
amendments voted on in 1965, Wisconsin voters have
now cast a total of 107 separate votes on constitutional
questions at 52 separate elections since the Constitution
was adopted. The 83 ratified changes involved 44
sections (including 9 sections created and 4 sections
repealed), and the 37 rejected changes involved 16
sections. Of those ratified, the Supreme Court later
invalidated 4 changes to 4 sections.57
55. Fairchild & Siebold, supra note 52, at 208, 210, 212, 222-23, 225.
56. WiS. CONST. art. I, § 22. John Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin
Constitution-Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 547-551 (1979).
57. WiS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, RESEARCH BULLETIN 66-5,
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROPOSALS, SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL, 1961-1965
WISCONSIN LEGISLATURES 1 (1966) [hereinafter WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU,
RESEARCH BULLETIN 66-5] (emphasis omitted); see also WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
LIBRARY, RESEARCH BULLETIN 129, DISPOSITION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE WISCONSIN
CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED BY THE 1941 TO 1959 LEGISLATURES (1960) [hereinafter WIS.
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, RESEARCH BULLETIN 129].
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In fact, a number of proposals have been introduced in the Wisconsin
legislature to study the need for a constitutional convention," and a
number of constitutional commissions have been utilized, often without
legislative funding, particularly beginning in the early 1960s."9
Interestingly, this wave of interest in the Wisconsin Constitution slightly
predated the wave of attention to state constitutions following the
United States Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote decisions.'
In addition, proposals to call a state constitutional convention in
Wisconsin have been regularly introduced in the legislature since at least
1907.61 None of these proposals sought a limited constitutional
convention and none of them were recommended by the legislature to
the voters.62 It is unclear from this vantage point what the level of
popular support was during these legislative considerations of whether
to call a constitutional convention. Therefore, even though the
Wisconsin Constitution has never been reformed or revised, the
possibility has certainly been considered by the legislature but never
presented to the voters.
IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN OTHER
STATES
There is a good deal that can be learned from other states that have
addressed the question of revising their state constitutions. Looking at
these experiences indicates that a number of different mechanisms have
been utilized, that there have been successes and failures, and that in the
final analysis each state presents its own unique set of state
constitutional concerns and challenges. The following brief summary is
58. See WiS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, RESEARCH BULLETIN 65-2,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN WISCONSIN 28-29 (1965) [hereinafter WIS. LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, RESEARCH BULLETIN 65-21.
59. Id. at 27. For a listing of the commission's December 1960 recommendations see id.
at 30-32. See also Fairchild, supra note 41, at 6.
60. James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 819, 839 (1991) (citations omitted):
[S]tate legislatures have once again become relatively democratic and
representative bodies as a result of the reapportionment revolution begun
in 1962 by Baker v. Carr. Not accidentally, that decision spurred a wave
of constitutional revision. No fewer than thirteen states revised their basic
charters between 1963 and 1976, reviving at least in part, the tradition of
activist popular sovereignty.
61. WiS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, RESEARCH BULLETIN 65-2, supra note
58, at 1, 4-6.
62. Id.
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intended to suggest some key features in state constitutional revision
attempts in a number of states.
A. New Jersey (1947)
New Jersey held a highly successful state constitutional convention
in 1947, culminating a number of years of attempts at revision, including
a legislatively-proposed constitution that was voted down in 1944.63 This
constitutional convention took place in the period of post-war optimism
and confidence in government. Very strong gubernatorial leadership
was a key element in the approval of the constitutional convention and
ratification of the convention's recommended revised constitution by
the voters. 6  Furthermore, a key limitation was placed on the
convention, thereby taking the question of reapportionment of the state
senate off the table. This divisive issue, threatening the control that
small counties had over the state, had stood in the way of state
constitutional revision for over a century.65 The convention met at
Rutgers University, not in the state capital, to avoid the appearance of
''politics as usual."
The leading commentator on the New Jersey State Constitutional
Convention of 1947 concluded:
First of all, the convention leaders had limited objectives,
basically to update the court system and modernize the
executive branch. They did not visualize their job as one
of righting all the wrongs in New Jersey's political and
social system. Rather, they looked at the old
constitution, at what history had shown to be its basic
weaknesses, and tried to correct those that seemed
alterable in terms of the current political milieu. This
provided marketability for the document and helped
ensure its substantive integrity. The 1947 New Jersey
constitution was relatively free from reformist gimmicks
and untested panaceas. Limited goals also gave the
constitution a more enduring character.'
63. See generally RICHARD J. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
IN NEW JERSEY: 1940-1947 (1970).
64. Id. at 192-93; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 15-16 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States,
No. 1, G. Alan Tarr series ed., 1997).
65. CONNORS, supra note 63, at 124-125; WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 15-16.
66. CONNORS, supra note 63, at 194.
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Out of the 1947 process, New Jersey achieved a revised state
constitution that gave it one of the best judicial systems in the United
States, a very strong governor, and modern rights provisions concerning
women's rights, collective bargaining, and racial segregation.67
B. Louisiana (1973)
The State of Louisiana, also after a number of attempts and with the
help of strong gubernatorial leadership6 convened a constitutional
convention in 1973. One leading commentator concluded, with respect
to the convention's product, "[l]ittle substantive change resulted, but the
document was superior technically. It was simplified, shortened, and
made more consistent. It was more of a triumph of the legal technicians
than of the reformers." 69  There were, however, some interesting
modern innovations in the rights' provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution, including an equal protection clause as well as a provision
stating that "[n]o law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations."7
C. Virginia (1968-1970)
Substantial revision of the Virginia Constitution was accomplished
through the constitutional commission process.7 The commission, with
67. For an excellent symposium commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of New Jersey's
constitution, see Tenth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 673
(1998). For a very interesting analysis of the ban on racial segregation, the first of its kind in
the country, see Bernard K. Freamon, The Origins of the Anti-Segregation Clause in the New
Jersey Constitution, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1267 (2004).
68. LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
16 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No. 4, G. Alan Tarr
series ed., 1991).
69. Id. at 17.
70. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; see Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1975); Louis "Woody" Jenkins, The Declaration of
Rights, 21 Loy. L. REV. 9, 16-17 (1975). Paradoxically, this provision, which stimulated
support by the NAACP for the 1974 constitution, was held by the Louisiana Supreme Court
to ban all forms of affirmative action. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 So.
2d. 1185, 1188 (La. 1996); Robert F. Williams, Shedding Tiers "Above and Beyond" the
Federal Floor: Loving State Constitutional Equality Rights to Death in Louisiana, 63 LA. L.
REV. 917,918 (2003).
71. A.E. Dick Howard, Adopting a New Constitution: Lessons from Virginia, in 1 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 74.
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strong gubernatorial backing,72 was authorized by the legislature, and its
members were named by the governor in 1968. 73 After detailed study,
public hearings, and deliberation, the commission submitted its report to
the governor and the legislature at the beginning of 1969."4 Based on
the commission's recommendations, the legislature debated the
proposals and presented its proposed revisions to the voters in four
separate questions, rather than as a "take-it-or-leave-it package in which
they were obliged to approve or disapprove all the constitutional
changes in a single question., 75 It is very important to note that in
Virginia, after the proposals of the commission were debated, revised,
and placed before the voters by the legislature, a privately-funded
committee was created to inform the people of Virginia about the
proposed changes and to encourage their support. 6  The leading
commentator on Virginia's successful constitutional revision, Professor
A.E. Dick Howard (a participant in the process himself), has
thoughtfully compared that state's success with problems encountered in
constitutional revision in other states during this period.77
D. Montana (1967-1972)
In 1967, the legislature in Montana assigned the legislative council to
prepare "a study of the Montana Constitution, to determine if it was
adequately serving the current needs of the people., 78 Based on the
council's recommendation, the legislature created a Constitution
Revision Commission in 1969."9 The Montana Constitution includes the
provision requiring an automatic question to be placed on the ballot
every twenty years as to whether there should be a constitutional
convention.80 These preparatory actions were taken in anticipation of
that vote in 1970, which was approved by a wide margin. Then,
72. Id. at 74, 101.
73. Id. at 74-75.
74. Id. at 75; COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIRGINIA: REPORT (1969).
75. Howard, supra note 71, at 78, 95.
76. Id. at 78-85.
77. Id. at 86-96. See generally A.E. Dick Howard, "For the Common Benefit":
Constitutional History in Virginia as a Casebook for the Modern Constitution-Maker, 54 VA.
L. REV. 816 (1968).
78. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 8 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No.
31, G. Alan Tarr series ed., 2001).
79. Id.
80. MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
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pursuant to legislative authorization and creation of another commission
to prepare for the convention, the constitutional convention met in
1972.8' The Montana convention met at a time when it could draw on
several trends in state constitutionalism. First was the movement
toward "managerial constitutionalism." 82
These managerial reformers believed that state
government had to be restructured to facilitate vigorous
action. Failure to create such proactive state
governments, they argued, would result in the erosion of
state power, as citizens increasingly looked to the
national government to address their concerns. To
establish an effective state government, they insisted,
required a constitution that was flexible and adaptable,
that placed few restrictions on how the state government
addressed current and future problems.83
There was a second, more recent trend.
The adherents of this newer view, which I call
constitutional populism, distrust activist government.
They are skeptical about their state legislature becoming
a "little Congress," their governor a "little president," or
their supreme court a "little Warren Court." They want
not a resurgence of state government but greater control
over what they perceive as overly expensive and
powerful state governments that are insulated from
popular concerns and popular control. '
Dr. Tarr concluded that the Montana Constitution "reflects a judicious
blending of the recommendations of both these reform movements." 8
But, he also concluded that the 1972 Montana constitutional convention
went beyond these two themes and included a number of important
innovations, including concern for the cultural heritage of Native
Americans, important expressions of the right to privacy, and rights
81. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 78, at 9-10.
82. G. Alan Tarr, The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective, 64 MONT. L. REV.
1,13 (2003).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 15.
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against private entities, together with an important concern for the
environment.'
Interestingly, the 1972 Montana Constitution, which was submitted
as a revised constitution, with separate votes on three controversial
issues: a unicameral legislature, the death penalty, and legalized
gambling, was adopted by the voters by an extremely narrow margin. 7
A legal challenge, contending that the constitution was actually not
ratified by a majority, was rejected by the Montana Supreme Court by a
3-2 vote.' Despite this narrow margin of approval, the Montana voters
overwhelmingly rejected the opportunity to call another constitutional
convention twenty years later in 1990.89
E. Michigan (1961-1962)
After the adoption in 1960 of an initiative amendment to the state
constitution easing the requirements for the calling of a state
constitutional convention, and requiring the question of whether a
constitutional convention should be called to be placed on the ballot in
1961 and every sixteen years thereafter, Michigan held a constitutional
convention in 1961-1962. 90 The Governor created a study commission
to prepare for the convention.9" After the legislature refused to provide
funding for the operation of the commission, a private foundation
stepped forward with financing.' Slightly over two-thirds of the
delegates to the convention were Republican.93  Michigan, like
Wisconsin, traces its constitutional origins to the Northwest Ordinance.94
86. Id. at 16-17.
87. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 78, at 14-15.
88. State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson, 500 P.2d 921, 929 (Mont. 1972); ELISON &
SNYDER, supra note 78, at 14-15.
89. Tarr, supra note 82, at 20-21; ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 78, at 16. See generally
The Honorable James R. Browning Symposium, The 1972 Montana Constitution: Thirty Years
Later, 64 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2003).
90. SUSAN P. FINO, THE MICHIGAN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 20-
21 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No. 24, G. Alan Tarr
series ed., 1996).
91. Id. at 21.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 23. Interestingly, this fact has not seemed to play heavily in Wisconsin
Supreme Court interpretations the way it has in other states. See Patrick Baude, Interstate
Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 835, 842-43 (1997).
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F. Georgia (1983)
In Georgia, based on the recommendations of a Constitutional
Revision Commission, the Georgia legislature engaged in a two-month
extraordinary session in 1964 and adopted a new constitution.9" The
document was, however, never submitted to the people because of a
federal court decision declaring that it was the product of a
malapportioned legislature. 96 Despite the fact that the United States
Supreme Court ultimately vacated the judicial decision,7 the new
constitution was never submitted to the voters. 98
In the 1970s, however, strong gubernatorial leadership led to the
recommendation that the legislature prepare a revised constitution, but
one without substantive revision. This was accomplished, and the voters
overwhelmingly adopted the document in 1976.'
The legislature immediately embarked on a process leading to
substantive revision of the Georgia Constitution. This process was also
based on strong gubernatorial leadership."°  A multi-year legislative
process culminated in 1982, and this legislative product was submitted to
the people and adopted overwhelmingly.' 1
A commentator on the Georgia process concluded:
Perhaps because the document was supported by the
leadership of all three branches of state government,
perhaps because there was an organized public education
campaign to explain it, perhaps because there was no
organized opposition to the proposal, or perhaps just
because the people had grown weary of twenty years'
worth of "talk" about constitutional revision, the
proposed new constitution was approved
overwhelmingly at the 1982 election.... 02
95. MELVIN B. HILL, JR., THE GEORGIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
14 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No. 21, G. Alan Tarr
series ed., 1994).
96. Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248, 258-59 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated, 379 U.S. 621
(1965); HILL, supra note 95.
97. Toombs, 379 U.S. at 622.
98. HILL, supra note 95, at 14.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id. There was criticism of the Georgia process on the ground that it did not
adequately involve the people in "popular sovereignty." Henretta, supra note 60, at 830-31.
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G. Florida (1967, 1977, 1997)
Beginning in 1966, the state of Florida utilized a constitutional
commission to prepare a revised draft of that state's 1885 constitution.
The commission's product was presented to the legislature, which held
an extraordinary session during the summer of 1967 to consider and
modify the commission's recommendations. The legislature's
recommended revised constitution was adopted by the people and went
into effect in 1968. '03 Florida's 1968 constitution contained a unique
mechanism for future state constitutional change: an appointed
constitution revision commission, automatically created every twenty
years (ten years for the first cycle), with the power to place its
recommendations directly on the ballot for the voters' approval without
sending them to the legislature." This new mechanism was
unprecedented and constituted "a leap of faith into the future, a license
to later generations with no guarantees as to the substantive outcomes
that would flow from the new process."' 15  This mechanism was, of
course, highly disturbing to the state legislature, but the people of
Florida rejected an amendment to the state constitution to remove the
constitution revision commission process. '06  In fact, the Florida
Constitution was amended to authorize the same commission
procedure, with direct access to the ballot, for budget and finance
matters.1°7 Several other states have considered Florida's commission
mechanism, but none have adopted it."°
Florida's initial experience with this constitution revision mechanism
ended in a failure. The 1977 commission submitted eight separate
103. Rebecca Mae Salokar, Constitutional Revision in Florida: Planning, Politics, Policy,
and Publicity, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 19, 21-22; TALBOT
D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 11-13
(Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No. 5, G. Alan Tarr series
ed., 1991).
104. Robert F. Williams, The Florida Constitution Revision Commission in Historic and
National Context, 50 FLA. L. REV. 215, 220 (1998); D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 103, at 13;
Salokar, supra note 103, at 22.
105. Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth Its Popular
Sovereignty Price? 52 FLA. L. REV. 249,255 (2000).
106. D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 103, at 15.
107. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6. See generally Donna Blanton, The Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission: Florida's Best Hope for the Future, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437 (1991).
108. Williams, supra note 105, at 256-57.
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propositions to the voters and all of them were defeated."M A casino
gambling amendment was also on the ballot and the Governor exerted
great energy opposing it, which left him with little time to support the
commission's proposals."'  Further, there was no organization or
funding to support the proposed revisions. Interestingly, however, the
commission's proposals set the agenda for state constitutional
discussions over the next decade, and a number of its recommendations
were later adopted through the amendment process."'
The 1997 Constitution Revision Commission, however, was much
more successful. A preparatory committee developed background
research and even proposed rules for the commission.1 '2 It learned a
number of lessons from the unsuccessful commission of twenty years
earlier and made a number of recommendations to the voters that were
accepted.1 3 The commission successfully utilized opinion polling during
its deliberations." ' The proposals were much more moderate than those
of 1978 because the commission required of itself a super-majority vote
before recommending a state constitutional change and an organization
was put into place to support the proposed revisions.'15
As a member of the Florida Bar, and a native Floridian, I had some
involvement in these processes and recently asked the following
question:
So, the question to be asked by Floridians, as well as
those in other states who are watching Florida's
experiment in the processes of state constitutionmaking,
is whether the very expansive deliberative record of the
commission, its arguable independence, and its success in
convincing the voters to accept its proposals make up for
its seemingly reduced legitimacy on account of its
appointed, rather than elected, membership."16
109. D'ALEMBERTE supra note 103, at 15; Salokar, supra note 103, at 26. For a
complete analysis of the 1978 commission's proposals, see Symposium on the Proposed
Revisions to the Florida Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 565 (1978).
110. Salokar, supra note 103, at 47.
111. Williams, supra note 105, at 257 n.30.
112. Salokar, supra note 103, at 34.
113. Id. at 35-37, 44.
114. Id. at 48-49.
115. Id. at 35-37, 47; Williams, supra note 105, at 260-61.
116. Williams, supra note 105, at 260. The Florida process was criticized for not
adequately involving the voters. See Joseph W. Little, The Need to Revise the Florida
Constitutional Revision Commission, 52 FLA. L. REv. 475 (2000).
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I concluded:
It is probably safe to say that Florida conducted the most
open and accessible review of a state constitution in the
history of our country. This is the source of the
Commission's legitimacy with the living generation, even
in the absence of prospective authorization by the
current generation. . . . Popular participation and
deliberation have taken the place of popular stimulus in
Florida constitutional revision.
117
Florida's process has been characterized by substantial preparatory
work and gubernatorial leadership. 1 8 The 1997 process, by contrast to
that in 1977, included an important post-commission process of
publicizing and supporting its proposals."9
H. New York (1967, 1997)
New York had a constitutional convention in 1967 that was highly
partisan and dominated by legislative leaders. 20  The revised
constitution presented by that convention to the voters was defeated at
the polls."' One recent analyst of these events noted:
Sitting legislators and others in the government industry
were heavily represented at the convention. And,
especially offensive to some, during the year that the
convention met, the constitutional provision for delegate
compensation "required" the legislators who were also
117. Williams, supra note 105, at 270.
118. Salokar, supra note 103, at 26-33.
119. Id. at 44-51.
120. Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question Referendum:
The New York Experience in National Context, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note
25, at 155. See generally HENRIK N. DULLEA, CHARTER REVISION IN THE EMPIRE STATE:
THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK'S 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1997).
121. Benjamin, supra note 120, at 155; see Lewis B. Kaden, The People: No! Some
Observations on the 1967 New York Constitutional Convention, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343
(1968); Robert B. McKay, Constitutional Revision in New York State: Disaster in 1967, 19
SYRACUSE L. REV. 207 (1967).
[90:425
2007] IS THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION OBSOLETE? 447
delegates, and others on public payrolls, to collect two
salaries and the attendant pension benefits. 122
In preparation for the 1997 automatic vote in New York on whether
to call a constitutional convention, in 1993 the Governor appointed a
constitutional revision commission to educate the public prior to the
vote and to develop possible constitutional proposals to obviate the
necessity of calling a constitutional convention. There was no legislative
funding, so the commission had to operate with gubernatorial
discretionary funds. 123  The commission ultimately recommended a
unique action-producing alternative to a state constitutional convention.
The commission's report sought to change the focus from the
constitutional convention to specific policy areas that were in need of
reform. These were "fiscal integrity, state [and] local relations,
education, and public safety."
' 124
The Commission proposed the creation of four Action
Panels designed to break the political/policy logjam in all
of these issue areas. The panels would create integrated
packages of legislation and constitutional amendments
by the close of the 1996 legislative session. In creating
these panels, the Commission also asked that the
governor and legislature "clearly commit themselves to
take definitive action on these final proposals by a date
certain."1
25
When the legislature failed to act, the commission recommended
that the voters approve the call for a constitutional convention. Despite
a vigorous campaign, including strong gubernatorial support, the voters
rejected the call in 1997.126 Dr. Gerald Benjamin concluded that the
1997 vote did not come at a propitious time, that legislators opposed the
calling of a convention that was unlimited and not their idea, that there
122. Benjamin, supra note 120, at 155; see also PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 28-29 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions
of the United States, No. 3, G. Alan Tarr series ed., 1991).
123. Benjamin, supra note 120, at 153.
124. Id. at 157.
125. Id. (citing TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION,
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT NOW FOR THE NEW CENTURY: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE, THE
GOVERNOR, AND THE LEGISLATORS OF NEW YORK (1995)); see also Documents, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 1355, 1394 (1995) (excerpts from the commission's report).
126. Benjamin, supra note 120, at 158-63.
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was a lack of a strong campaign supporting the constitutional
convention call, and that there was an array of interest groups who
feared a constitutional convention and potential changes to the status
quo.127
L Alabama (1994-present)
Alabama is still operating under its 1901 constitution. Efforts at
reforming it go back many years but saw renewed emphasis in the past
decade or So.28 Despite strong gubernatorial leadership, and a broad,
grassroots organization supporting constitutional revision, the voters
overwhelmingly rejected a package of tax reforms and an amendment
permitting the simplification of Alabama's longest-in-nation state
constitution. 129 Despite this defeat, the activities of the past decade have
gone a long way to raise the level of civic debate about the state
constitution, and possibly the "events of 2003 may prove to be the
opening skirmish for a greater battle ahead."'
31
J. Texas (1971-1975)
After the Supreme Court reapportionment decisions and early
gubernatorial support, the Texas legislature proposed a constitutional
amendment that would authorize the legislature itself to serve as a
unicameral constitutional convention in 1974.' 3' This amendment also
provided for a preparatory constitutional revision commission. After
approval of this amendment by the voters, the legislature established the
constitutional revision commission which was widely representative of
the Texas citizenry. 33 The commission engaged in a broadly-inclusive
process and recommended a revised state constitution to the Texas
legislature, which convened as a constitutional convention for six
months in 1974. Ultimately, the convention adjourned "after failing by
127. Id. at 159-66. See generally DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW
YORK (Gerald Benjamin & Henrik N. Dullea eds., 1997).
128. H. Bailey Thomson, Constitutional Reform in Alabama: A Long Time in Coming, in
1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 113-24. See generally Symposium on the
Alabama Constitution, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 189 (2002-2003).
129. Thomson, supra note 128, at 126-38.
130. Id. at 139; see also Symposium, Celebrating the Centennial of the Alabama
Constitution: An Impetus for Reflection, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
131. JANICE C. MAY, THE TEXAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 24-25
(Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No. 26, G. Alan Tarr
series ed., 1996).
132. Id. at 25.
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three votes to approve the final revision package." ' 33 Dr. Janice May, a
member of the Constitutional Revision Commission, explained this
failure:
Several reasons have been put forward to explain the
convention's failure to agree on a new constitution.
Among the most plausible are the following: the lame-
duck status and relative inexperience of the convention
president; the legislative political environment in an
election year that exacerbated divisive tendencies;
several controversial propositions, including a
constitutional right-to-work proposal that generated
bitter labor union opposition; the solid Black Caucus
bloc vote against the final package; a spirited race for the
speakership for the next legislature that was going on
during the convention; and the two-thirds vote
requirement of the authorizing constitutional
amendment, which under normal conditions might not
have mattered but possibly did in the highly unusual and
politically charged situation at the convention.'4
Interestingly, at its next session, the Texas legislature submitted
most of the proposed changes it had considered sitting as a
constitutional convention to the voters as eight separate amendments at
a special election in 1975. In a very light turnout, after a poorly-funded
campaign, the voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposals.' 3
K. California (1993-1996)
In California, a constitutional revision commission met beginning in
1993 during a budget crisis and made its recommendations to the
legislature in 1996.36 Dr. Bruce Cain, a member of the commission,
noted, "This Commission undertook a comprehensive look at California
governance and ultimately proposed some far-reaching and imaginative
133. Id. at 26; see also id. at 422 (citing A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR TEXAS: TEXT,
EXPLANATION, COMMENTARY (1973); A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR TEXAS: SEPARATE
STATEMENTS OF COMMISSION MEMBERS (1973)).
134. MAY, supra note 131, at 26-27.
135. Id. at 27; see also id. at 404; Janice C. May, Texas Constitutional Revision: Lessons
and Laments, 66 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 64 (1977).
136. Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California: The Triumph of Amendment
Over Revision, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 25, at 59, 67.
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ideas. But in the end, these recommendations never got to a vote in the
legislature, let alone a place on the ballot."'37 Apparently, because of an
improved economy, the complexity of some of the issues, and the vested
interests of a number of legislators and other elected officials, the
revision commission's proposals were essentially doomed when they
were sent to the legislature. 3 '
L. Illinois (1968-1970)
The state of Illinois in the 1960s built on several "decades of effort
by civic groups to provide a climate of opinion favorable to
constitutional reform." 39  Despite the adoption in 1950 of an
amendment to the state constitution that liberalized Illinois'
constitutional amendment process, substantial revision had not taken
place. 4 °  The Illinois legislature created a Constitution Study
Commission in 1965, and after several years of deliberation, it
recommended the calling of a constitutional convention. The legislature
followed this recommendation, together with the commission's other
suggestion that no other amendments be submitted to the voters at the
1968 general election. 4' The voters approved the convention call after a
privately-funded campaign for adoption, which included substantial
gubernatorial support. The private group relied on statewide opinion
polls in designing its campaign.142
Interestingly, after the convention call was approved by the voters, a
second commission was established by the legislature to advise it and
the governor on framing the "enabling act for the election of delegates
and organization of the convention." " 43  There was even a third
commission created by the legislature to make preparations immediately
before the convention was convened.'" The constitutional convention
delegates, elected on a nonpartisan basis, worked from December 1969
137. Id. at 60; see also CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1996).
138. Cain, supra note 136, at 65-70; see also CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN
CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE (Bruce
E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995).
139. JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS 1818-1970, 138 (1972).
140. Id. at 123-37.
141. Id. at 139-40.
142. Id. at 142.
143. Id. at 144.
144. Id. at 144 n.6.
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through September 1970.' 5 The site of the convention was moved from
the legislative chambers to a different location, primarily to make room
for the legislative session, but also to put some distance between the
convention and "ordinary politics." This had been done successfully
with New Jersey's 1947 constitutional convention and Alaska's 1955-
1956 convention.' 46  The convention succeeded in proposing a
modernized constitution for Illinois which was adopted by the voters in
December of 1970.147
The president of the Illinois constitutional convention, Samuel
Witwer, reflected on the experience:
From the outset, the convention delegates were
reminded, with an eye to ultimate voter approval, that
their task was to write not the best possible constitution
but rather the best constitution that could possibly be
adopted in this politically complex state. I believe that
we came close to that goal. But such a choice implies
unmet governmental needs and continued opportunities
for further constitutional reforms. 8
M. Maryland (1966-1968)
In Maryland, following the United States Supreme Court's one-
person, one-vote decisions, based on the initiative of the governor, a
constitution commission was formed to prepare for a 1966 automatic
(but not always honored by the legislature) referendum on whether to
call a constitutional convention.49 The convention call was approved by
the voters, convention delegates were elected, and the convention met
from 1967 to early 1968. '50 The convention's proposed constitutional
revision was soundly defeated at the polls in 1968.5' This has lead
145. Id. at 149-55.
146. Id. at 153.
147. Id. at 162-63. See generally The Illinois Constitution of 1970: A Symposium Issue, 6
J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 213 (1973).
148. Samuel W. Witwer, Introduction, 6 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 213, 213
(1973).
149. Dan Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited: Modern Maryland Constitutional
Law from 1967 to 1998, 58 MD. L. REV. 528,530-32 (1999).
150. Id. at 532-33. See generally WAYNE R. SWANSON ET AL., POLITICS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE, 1967-1968 (1970).
151. Friedman, supra note 149, at 534; see also DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 9-10 (Reference Guides to the State
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Maryland's experience to be referred to as the "Magnificent Failure."'52
One commentator has summarized the various views about the reasons
for this failure:
Some commentators have blamed the content of the
proposed constitution, suggesting that it was "too liberal"
for Maryland. Some have argued that the convention
delegates themselves were too intellectual or too liberal
to represent the Maryland electorate. Some political
scientists point to the fact that the entire constitution was
submitted to the voters for a single vote, as a "single
package deal," and suggest convincingly that this
contributed to the defeat. Still others blame the
convention delegates and those responsible for the
ratification campaign for their lack of political skill. But
all commentators agree that the proponents of the
constitution failed to persuade the electorate of the
necessity of constitutional revision. 153
Interestingly however, the convention's proposals that were rejected in
1968 formed the basis for a number of specific state constitutional
changes over the following generation."
There are a number of lessons that can be learned even from this
kind of superficial review of state constitution-making over the past
several generations.
(1) State constitutional revision can be a long, multi-stage, difficult
process with no guarantee of success, and sometimes spanning
a number of decades. In Wisconsin, the movement for
Constitutions of the United States, No. 41, G. Alan Tarr series ed., 2006); Robert J.
Martineau, Maryland's 1967-68 Constitutional Convention: Some Lessons for Reformers, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1196 (1970).
152. JOHN P. WHEELER, JR. & MELISSA KINSEY, MAGNIFICENT FAILURE: THE
MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-1968 (1970).
153. Friedman, supra note 149, at 534-35 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 529 ("This Article assesses the success or failure of the Maryland
Constitutional Convention in light of the later adoption-by constitutional amendment,
statute, or regulation-of many of the important innovations proposed in the 1967-1968
constitution.").
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constitutional revision beginning either now (and actually in
the 1960s), or even earlier, may provide this background.
(2) Sometimes the existing processes of state constitutional change
must themselves be reformed, even on a one-time basis, to
make way for successful state constitutional revision.
(3) The timing of state constitutional revision must be right for
both citizens and political actors. State constitutional revision,
regardless of its merits, can be overshadowed by other matters
such as other proposed constitutional amendments, legislative
reapportionment, changing economic conditions, election
campaigns, etcetera. Political circumstances can change while
state constitutional revision is being considered.
(4) Strong, active gubernatorial leadership is necessary but not
always sufficient for successful state constitutional revision.
(5) State constitutional revision takes place within the state's
ongoing political structure, and changes in state constitutions
involve important political questions.
(6) Detailed preparations must be attended to, concerning:
a. whether a constitutional convention call should be made
or a constitutional commission created;
b. informing and educating the public prior to the vote if a
constitutional convention call is to be made;
c. what should be included within the constitutional
convention call (i.e. an unlimited or a limited convention)
or commission mandate;
d. careful consideration of processes for electing delegates if
a constitutional convention call is to be made, or
appointing members if a commission is to be used, with a
preference for a nonpartisan approach;155
e. legislative implementation of a positive decision by the
voters on a convention call;
f. prior to a constitutional convention or commission,
background research and even the proposal of draft
rules, preferably prepared by a separate committee or
commission.
155. See Richard Briffault, Electing Delegates to a State Constitutional Convention: Some
Legal and Policy Issues, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1125, 1156-57 (2005).
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(7) The legislature may refuse, through an exercise of "legislative
passive aggression, ' to provide funding for any of these
preparatory activities. Under such circumstances there may be
a need for private or gubernatorial funding.
(8) The convention or commission must focus on what is politically
achievable, rather than the best theoretical state constitutional
revision. The convention or commission must therefore engage
in self-restraint, and structure its deliberations and voting so
that proposed revisions are recommended by substantial
consensus.
(9) Leadership in constitutional conventions and commissions is
absolutely crucial to the success of such a body.157
(10) Consideration should be given to holding the convention or
commission sessions away from the state capital to avoid the
appearance of "politics as usual."
(11) Widespread use of modern information technology, such as
interactive websites, email, and live internet video coverage
should be used to educate and involve the public in a
transparent, deliberative constitutional revision process.
Modern public opinion polling and focus group techniques can
be used during deliberations to predict the political acceptance
of certain proposed constitutional changes and to inform
constitution-makers of needed modifications prior to adoption
and submission of final proposals to the voters.
(12) The convention or commission should give serious
consideration to separating controversial proposals for their
individual presentation to the voters rather than a single "take-
it-or-leave-it" package. On the other hand, if proposals are
interdependent as part of a coherent revision, they should be
identified as such to the voters and presented together if
possible under the state's established processes, or if required
to be presented separately, they should be interlocked so that
156. Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question Referendum:
The New York Experience in National Context, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2002); Tarr &
Williams, supra note 38, at 1100 n.130.
157. ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., JAY S. GOODMAN & WAYNE R. SWANSON, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN
STATES 199 (1975) ("The key roles played by the presidents of the various conventions
emerged unmistakably. All that we know descriptively about convention behavior
underscores the vital importance of the role of the presiding officer.").
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the adoption of each is dependent on the adoption of the
other(s).
(13) There must be a well-funded organization (probably not
governmental) to advocate for the proposed revisions after the
convention or commission has made its recommendations.
(14) Even a disappointing, apparent "failure" of substantial state
constitutional revision or reform may actually have the positive
effect of setting the terms of debate, concerning piecemeal
constitutional change by amendment over the following
generation.
These and many other lessons can be drawn from the state
constitutional revision experience in other states in the second half of
the twentieth century. Such lessons must be applied, however, in the
current, Wisconsin context.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Constitutional revision is not for the faint of heart. It is
not a Sunday drive in the mountains. It is an incredibly
difficult, sometimes tedious, sometimes exhilarating,
always a challenging undertaking requiring the
cooperation of the leadership of all three branches of
state government, of counties, municipalities, and local
school boards, of the business community and the labor
community, of public interest groups and private interest
groups, of people inside the government and people
outside the government-in short, it requires the
cooperation of just about everybody.
Georgia Governor George D. Busbee (1983)58
Since the drafting of the 1948 Wisconsin Constitution, both the
processes for revising and the content of state constitutions have
undergone dramatic change. First, the process of state constitutional
reform or revision has been transformed from citizens' exercise of
158. George D. Busbee, An Overview of the New Georgia Constitution, 35 MERCER L.
REv. 1, 1-2 (1983).
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popular sovereignty'59 to a more elite and professional exercise.
According to Alan Tarr:
Perhaps the most striking trend is toward the
professionalization of state constitutional change....
Typically, it has been political elites and professional
reformers who have campaigned for constitutional
revision, with the populace reduced to rejecting
convention calls and proposed constitutions to register its
distrust of a process that it no longer feels it controls."6°
Could this view accurately describe the current concern for
constitutional revision in Wisconsin? Is there any grassroots wave of
concern about the Wisconsin Constitution? Could there be with
adequate public education?
Further, since Wisconsin's original constitution was drafted, the
content of many of the states' constitutions has evolved from short, basic
documents of government organization and citizen rights to longer
constitutions that have been expanded to include a number of specific
policies that could have been left to the legislature. 16 In fact, there has
been a major shift in the idea of what the function of a state constitution
should be and what matters are important enough to be contained
therein. '6' Christian Fritz noted this shift in the attitudes of constitution-
makers during the nineteenth century as the American society and
economy became more complex, particularly with the rise of powerful
corporations. 63 These constitution-makers believed that they needed to
include more material in state constitutions, even if it was in areas that
could, theoretically, be governed by legislation. Professor Fritz
concluded:
The key to explaining the growing length of
nineteenth-century constitutions lies in the delegates'
understanding of the purpose of constitutions. There
159. Henretta, supra note 60, at 826.
160. TARR, supra note 11, at 170.
161. Id. at 9-12.
162. Id. at 132-33.
163. See Christian G. Fritz, Rethinking the American Constitutional Tradition: National
Dimensions in the Formation of State Constitutions, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 969 (1995) (reviewing
DAVID A. JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CALIFORNIA, OREGON, AND NEVADA,
1840-1890 (1992)).
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was common agreement that the nature and object of
constitutions extended beyond fundamental principles to
what delegates called constitutional legislation.
Delegates willingly assumed an institutional role that
occasionally supplanted the ordinary legislature.' 6
Wisconsin has a number of available opportunities for state
constitutional revision as opposed to piecemeal amendment. Of course,
a process of piecemeal amendment may turn out to be adequate for
state constitutional problems that exist in Wisconsin. In any event, the
Texas approach of a one-time state constitutional amendment
authorizing the legislature to convene as a constitutional convention and
submit its proposed revised constitution to the people either as a single
package or separate propositions is one possibility. The Michigan and
Illinois changes in their processes of constitutional change are others.
These processes would represent a form of staged constitutional
revision, utilizing a vote of the people at two points: first, to approve the
amendment modifying the process of revising the constitution (even on
a one-time basis); and second, at the point of approval or rejection of
the revision proposal(s). A variation on this approach would be to
propose an amendment adopting a Florida-style appointed constitution
revision commission, even on a one-time basis, with authority to submit
its proposal(s) directly to the people. This would also involve two
exercises of popular sovereignty or votes by the people of Wisconsin.
Next, the "extratextual" approach of a constitution revision
commission that would make recommendations to the legislature could
be utilized.165 State constitutional commissions can be created either by
the legislature or the governor, and receive funding from either
source. 166  Such commissions can be limited in their mandate.
Legislatures have sometimes authorized state constitutional
commissions as a substitute for a constitutional convention that is feared
by the legislature.1 67  State constitutional commissions can also be
164. Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
945, 964-65 (1994); supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
165. Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The
Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA
L. & POL'Y SYMP. 1, 2 (1996); see also Peter J. Mazzei & Robert F. Williams, "Traces of Its
Labors": The Constitutional Commission, The Legislature, and Their Influence on the New
Jersey State Constitution, 1873-1875, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 1059, 1062-68 (2002).
166. Williams, supra note 165, at 4-5.
167. Id. at 9.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
utilized to prepare for and assist a constitutional convention.'" New
Jersey even recently utilized a commission ("Task Force") to advise the
legislature on how to call and structure a limited constitutional
convention on property tax.'69 In a number of states, commissions have
failed at certain points in time only to succeed in a later generation, and
vice versa. Just because commissions failed in Wisconsin in the 1960s
does not mean one or more of them would fail now. Finally,
commissions can evaluate the need for mere change or more extensive
revision, and the possible processes for each. In this way, these
questions can be fully evaluated rather than prejudged without sufficient
consideration.
With respect to calling a constitutional convention itself, article XII,
section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution only requires that a one-time
majority vote of the legislature is necessary to ask the voters to approve
or reject a constitutional convention. This leaves maximum flexibility
with the legislature to provide for the election of delegates, the timing of
the convention, and other details. Only states whose constitutions do
not mention constitutional conventions at all possess greater
flexibility. 1 70 By contrast, some states specify the nature of the question
to be put to the voters concerning a constitutional convention, the form
of which sometimes precludes the possibility of a limited constitutional
convention.'7 Therefore, it seems as though the Wisconsin Constitution
would provide no barrier to a limited constitutional convention if the
limits were specified by the legislature and approved by the voters.'7 1
This way certain controversial or "hot button" topics could be "taken
off the table" leaving room to achieve necessary state constitutional
revision.
Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais have observed what they call
"conventionphobia" in this country.1 73 Even states with an automatic
vote on whether to call a convention have not had recent success. "In
the quarter century between 1960 and 1985 automatic convention calls
were approved only in New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Alaska....
In each of four states that provided for an automatic convention call
during the early 1990s-Alaska, New Hampshire, Ohio and Michigan-
168. Id. at 11.
169. Tarr & Williams, supra note 38, at 1104-05.
170. Id. at 1086, 1090.
171. Id. at 1086-87.
172. See id. at 1086-92.
173. Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L.
& POL'Y SYMP. 53,70 (1996).
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majorities have rejected the opportunity."'74  This has also occurred in
New York, Rhode Island, Illinois, and Montana. The rejection of
convention calls has been occurring at the same time that dissatisfaction
with state government has been increasing. The public seems to view a
constitutional convention as political business as usual by the
"government industry."' 75 Constitutional conventions seem to have lost
their legitimacy in the public mind. At the time Wisconsin's original
constitution was drafted, the politicians and special interests were afraid
of the people acting through constitutional conventions. Now, by
contrast, the people are afraid of politicians and special interests acting
through constitutional conventions. In 1848, limited constitutional
conventions used to alleviate the fears of voters and politicians, and
vested interests were not utilized.
Under these circumstances, in states, unlike Wisconsin, that permit
the state constitution to be amended through the initiative, that avenue
is likely to be seen by the public as having more popular legitimacy than
a convention. But the initiative lacks the possibility of deliberation.
7 6
Gais and Benjamin concluded:
174. Id. at 69 (citation omitted). Benjamin and Gais had observed a year earlier:
The number of active constitutional conventions has also dropped from
seven between 1968 and 1969, to just two between 1978 and 1979, to none
between 1990 and 1991. Moreover, all of the convention calls that some
states are required to put on their ballots have gone down to defeat in
recent years: New Hampshire, Alaska, and Montana placed such
questions before the voters between 1990 and 1992, but all were defeated,
as was Michigan's in 1994.
Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A
Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1303 (1995).
175. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 174, at 1304; Benjamin & Gais, supra note 173, at 71.
176. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 174, at 1301.
A more important question is whether the constitutional initiative is a
deliberative process, one that involves discussion, learning, and
accommodation among all citizens or their representatives regarding
common problems. Deliberation is crucial in settling constitutional
questions. If we want people to view a constitution as legitimate, we must
be sure they believe the rules and institutions it prescribes to be
reasonable and fair. That is not an easy task, particularly now, when
government institutions must often make decisions which many citizens
and interest groups oppose.
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What we need instead are constitutional revision
procedures that are deliberative as well as legitimate-
procedures that command legitimacy by providing for
direct citizen participation and control, but that also
generate and assess alternative proposals, take into
account the best available information about their likely
effects, consider the interactions between the proposed
changes and the rest of the constitutional structure, and
afford opportunities for discussion and accommodation
among significant political interests.'77
Gais and Benjamin called for an additional element to achieve
meaningful, publicly acceptable state constitutional revision:
independence. 78 The initiative method also provides independence but,
as mentioned before, does not provide for deliberation.
Obviously, it's very important to try to gauge opposition or status
quo instincts ahead of time. A massive study of seven constitutional
conventions concluded:
Just as the delegates and the political activists in each
state tended to break down, ultimately, into 'reformers'
and supporters of the 'status quo,' so the electorate
divides in a similar fashion .... In short, constitutional
revision potentially polarizes state communities, or the
attentive portions of them, along predictable lines. 179
It is clear, however, that in a number of states as a result of
perseverance, the proper leadership, and the right timing, opportunities
have arisen for the exercise of high levels of statesmanship. Under the
right circumstances, state political actors have transcended ordinary,
short-term politics and embarked on high-level, far-reaching
"recurrence to fundamental principles" in reforming their state's
constitution for the betterment of themselves and future generations.18"
Sometimes this process takes a period of debate and collegiality before a
higher-level, "constitutional-revision culture" is achieved by members of
a constitutional commission or convention. Sometimes it never
happens.
177. Id. at 1303.
178. Id. at 1299.
179. CORNWELL, JR., GOODMAN, & SWANSON, supra note 157, at 205-06.
180. Sundquist, supra note 56, at 556.
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Careful consideration must be given to the important connection-
the linkage-between the identified problems in the content of a state
constitution and the mechanism, or process chosen to address the
problems. The mechanism should be tailored to the nature of the
problems. Once again, of course, people may disagree about the nature
of the problems, but if a consensus develops on the areas in need of
change that may dictate the process of state constitutional change that
should be utilized.
VI. CONCLUSION
Frank Grad and I have argued that the burden of persuasion should
be upon those who seek to include material in state constitutions. 8' It
can be argued that a similar presumption should be applied to those who
advocate the calling of a state constitutional convention. This is a time-
consuming, expensive, and uncertain process. It can yield great rewards
for a state, but it can also fail or result in the inclusion of problematic
material within a state constitution. There are, as noted herein, a
number of less ambitious or even preliminary alternatives, such as
legislatively-proposed amendments, constitutional commissions, or
limited state constitutional conventions to assess the current state
constitution.
The issues that would come before a Wisconsin state constitutional
convention now, or in the near future, would be substantially different
from those associated with reform proposals in earlier decades or
generations. The functions and responsibilities of states have evolved
over time. 182 As one of the most in-depth studies of state constitutional
conventions concluded:
Doubtless one could take a cluster of constitutional
conventions in any era-the Jacksonian period, the years
of reconstruction or post-reconstruction, the turn-of-the-
century progressive era-and find patterns of issue
uniformity in each. In other words, there are broad areas
of agreement in any one period as to what "modern,"
"effective," "democratic" state government consists of,
but little such agreement over time. Conventions in one
181. GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 30.
182. Id. at 8-14.
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era meet to undo the careful reforms of an earlier
generation. 183
In other words, a state constitutional convention would not only be
concerned with revisions of the existing constitution, but would be
confronted with the local, regional, and national issues of importance at
that point in time."
All of these concerns point to the conclusion that decision-makers in
Wisconsin should carefully evaluate the question of whether state
constitutional revision or reform is really called for, and if so, whether
the time and expense of a state constitutional convention is merited.
Possibly, even if there is a need for reform or revision, a state
constitutional commission would be the logical starting point. Further, a
possible initial step would involve some changes, even one-time-only
changes, in Wisconsin's mechanisms of state constitutional change. This
was utilized in Texas, albeit unsuccessfully, and with more success in
Michigan and Illinois.185 Finally, a careful evaluation must focus on
whether the passage of time and the accretion of specific amendments
over the years have rendered the Wisconsin Constitution functionally
incoherent. Is there really a need for "fundamental reconsideration" of
Wisconsin's "constitutional foundations?"' 86  Are any of Wisconsin's
governmental structures so fundamentally flawed in their operation, or
is the interrelationship among them so dysfunctional, as to require
fundamental reconsideration of their constitutional foundations in an
independent, deliberative process such as the "heavy artillery" of a
constitutional convention that can assess proposed changes, in terms of
their coherence with the rest of the Wisconsin Constitution?" If such
fundamental flaws do exist, leading to incoherence, are they located in
one or several parts of the constitution, such that they could be
addressed by a limited constitutional commission or convention to avoid
183. CORNWELL, JR., GOODMAN & SWANSON, supra note 157, at 203; see also GRAD &
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 24-25.
184. For a consideration of current issues in state constitutional change, see generally 3
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, supra note 1.
185. See supra Parts IV.E, J, L.
186. See Tarr, supra note 1, at 2.
187. See Robert J. Martin, Calling in Heavy Artillery to Assault Politics as Usual: Past
and Prospective Deployment of Constitutional Conventions in New Jersey, 29 RUTGERS L.J.
963, 964-65 (1998).
[90:425
2007] IS THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION OBSOLETE? 463
the "Pandora's box" element of "conventionphobia?" 188 How can the
legislature be convinced to take any of these steps? It is these difficult
questions, the evaluation of which begins here at this conference, which
must be addressed to determine if the Wisconsin Constitution is
obsolete and in need of fundamental reform, and if so, whether anything
can be done about it.
188. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 174, at 1304 ("Citizens may fear that constitutional
conventions would open up a 'Pandora's box' or 'can of worms' in which delegates would
make enormous constitutional changes with little or no public accountability.").
* * *
